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The media, affect, and community in a decade of disasters: 
reporting the 1985 Bradford City stadium fire
Shane Ewen and Aaron Andrews
School of Cultural Studies and Humanities, Leeds Beckett University, Leeds, UK
ABSTRACT
This article examines the 1985 Bradford City stadium fire through the 
coverage of the national, local, and specialist print and broadcast 
media. Drawing upon extensive media coverage, it argues that the 
reporting of the fire provides a useful lens through which to under-
stand the emotional environment and construction of communities 
during Britain’s ‘decade of disasters’. Moreover, archival sources have 
been consulted to reveal the multiplicity of personal and collective 
responses to the media reporting of the fire, covering both the 
immediate and longer-term aftermath. Through letters sent by mem-
bers of the public to the Bradford Disaster Appeal Fund, it shows how 
people received media narratives and articulated their own affective 
bonds with the tragedy. These included declarations of belonging, 
through which the disaster became the impetus for the creation of 
a multicultural civic identity in Bradford. Finally, it uses social services 
records to show how survivors and the bereaved continued to be 
affected by the disaster even as the story of the fire—as told in the 
mass media and through memorial ceremonies—turned towards 
resilience and recovery.
KEYWORDS 
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Saturday, 11 May 1985 was supposed to be a day of celebration. Having won promotion 
to the Second Division as champions, Bradford City Football Club hosted Lincoln City at 
Valley Parade stadium for the final match of the season. Before kick-off, the cup was 
paraded in front of the sell-out crowd and players held aloft signs spelling out ‘thank you’ 
in recognition of their supporters. The souvenir matchday programme proclaimed the 
championship win ‘an outstanding landmark in Bradford City’s 82 year history.’1 Unusually 
for a Third Division match, the game was a mass media event. Television cameras and 
press photographers were in attendance to record the celebrations and the match was 
screened live to millions of viewers across the country. Towards the end of an uneventful 
first-half, supporters and commentators noticed a glowing light emanating from under-
neath the flooring of the wooden stand near the back of Block G. A small fire had taken 
hold underneath the seating area. Police officers in attendance at the match were called 
to the scene, the fire service notified, and club stewards appealed for calm from suppor-
ters, the majority of whom were reportedly unperturbed by the fire—one fan poured the 
remainder of his cup of coffee through the crack in the seating to try and extinguish the 
flames.2 A police officer called for a fire extinguisher, but a delay meant that it arrived too 
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late to be of use. It later emerged that the club’s chairman, Stafford Heginbotham, had 
declined to make extinguishers available in the main stand because he feared that they 
would be misused by hooligans.3
Within four minutes, the fire had overcome the wooden stand, lighting the pitch roof 
and causing burning debris to drop onto supporters, who were also being choked by thick 
smoke. The police evacuated the stand, first by the gates located near the turnstiles at the 
back, which were kept locked during matches to prevent supporters from gaining free 
entry, and subsequently by the front onto the pitch—a drop of approximately six feet 
onto a concrete terrace followed by a scramble over hoardings. As supporters swarmed 
onto the pitch, some with their jackets and hair alight, the game was abandoned and the 
injured were transported to local hospitals. In total, the bodies of 52 people were removed 
from the burned-out stand; four patients later succumbed to their injuries at the regional 
burns unit in Wakefield, leaving 56 dead and over 260 injured. It was then the largest 
single football disaster in modern British history—until the Hillsborough stadium disaster 
four years later, which caused the deaths of 96 Liverpool supporters—and the first in 
a series of mass casualty events which would come to define the 1980s.
The Bradford fire has been the focus of academic studies seeking to learn the lessons of 
the tragedy for future stadium safety and disaster response.4 During the twentieth century, 
the football stadium became a site of danger as successive disasters led to the loss of life in 
and around the arena.5 Compounded by the moral panic surrounding football hooliganism, 
the sport and the stadium were in crisis by the 1980s despite efforts over the previous 
decade to modernise them. Nevertheless, the scope of stadium modernisation was limited: 
many of the new regulations, including those regarding fire safety, did not apply to 
Bradford’s Valley Parade as the club was then in the Third Division. In a tragic irony, on 
the day of the fire, the local newspaper, the Telegraph & Argus (T&A), reported on the 
redevelopment of the stadium which was to begin the next day in order to prepare the club 
for the Second Division.6 The fire at Valley Parade also occurred on the same day as crowd 
violence between supporters of Birmingham City and Leeds United, which saw a crumbling 
wall separating supporters from the rival clubs collapse and fatally injure a 15-year-old boy 
attending his first match.7 A public inquiry, chaired by the High Court Judge, Oliver 
Popplewell, subsequently probed the events that occurred at Birmingham and Bradford, 
conflating the separate issues of crowd safety with the control of supporter behaviour, 
which drew complaints of insensitivity from the Labour Party and Bradford MPs. Less than 
three weeks later, crowd disturbance between supporters from Liverpool and Juventus 
overshadowed the European Cup Final in Heysel, Belgium, causing the deaths of 39 people; 
this event was subsequently added to Popplewell’s terms of reference for his final report, 
which was issued in January 1986.8 The crisis of football hooliganism, and its close associa-
tion with stadium design and safety, therefore inflected the emotional response to the 
disaster and the construction of communities which resulted.
While the importance of the Bradford City stadium fire for the sport of football and 
disaster management are clear, its broader social and cultural significance within the city, 
the 1980s, and in the lives of the bereaved has been little explored. The 1980s were, as 
contemporaries described it, a ‘decade of disasters’.9 The term itself, from a chronological 
point of view, is slightly problematic because the fire was the first in a series of mass media 
disasters which occurred in the second half of the 1980s. Bradford was followed, less than 
three weeks later, by the Heysel Stadium tragedy; in 1987 by the Zeebrugge ferry disaster 
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(193 fatalities) and King’s Cross station fire (31 fatalities); in 1988, the Lockerbie bombing 
(243 fatalities) and Piper Alpha offshore oil rig explosion (187 fatalities); and, in 1989, the 
Hillsborough disaster (96 fatalities), among others. Such were their scale, frequency, and 
social and cultural impact, in 1989 the Mass Observation Project asked its respondents to 
reflect on ‘the succession of public disasters’ which ‘cannot be ignored in the history of 
the 1980s’.10 Together these tragedies called into question the contradiction between 
a government committed to deregulating the free market and its statutory obligation to 
protect public safety where private and commercial organisations failed to do so. While 
the preceding decades were certainly not immune to mass tragedy, the decade of 
disasters raised significant issues about the effects of the retreat of the developmental 
state and its replacement by the private sector on people—and their safety—in their 
everyday lives.11
The decade of disasters also called into question the ways in which the media reported 
mass casualty tragedies and treated the victims, survivors, and the bereaved, which will 
form the main focus of this article. Historians have argued that scrutiny of the popular 
media in its multiple forms is integral both for understanding disasters and historicising 
the 1980s.12 While it was later eclipsed by subsequent disasters, the Bradford City stadium 
fire clearly highlights the role of the mass media in shaping narratives during the decade 
of disasters. Within the context of changing media technologies—when footage of 
disasters could be, sometimes unwittingly, broadcast live to the public—their reporting 
increasingly affected the way individual audience members, survivors, the bereaved, and 
state institutions understood, experienced, and responded to the disaster. The local and 
national press became a forum for people to express their emotional response to the fire, 
including anger directed towards the club and local authorities at the way warnings were 
ignored before the disaster occurred, and at the national press and particular journalists 
who published sensationalist and misleading reports.13 The media continues to shape 
people’s experiences of disasters—especially those of survivors and the bereaved—long 
after the event.
This article examines the reporting of the Bradford City stadium fire to show how 
disasters were understood, experienced, and responded to during the 1980s. In doing so, 
it builds on Stephen Brooke’s argument that ‘Emotion provide[s] a framework of knowl-
edge and a language for understanding and representing a particular social and political 
world’.14 The social and political world of the later 1980s was, this article argues, increas-
ingly shaped by the preponderance of disasters. This is demonstrated through the 
examination of media reports, letters to the Bradford Disaster Appeal Fund, and the 
personal reflections of people injured or bereaved in the disaster which were collected 
by social workers in the city. Firstly, it examines the use of disaster imagery on television 
and in the press to show how the changing emotional environment shaped the types of 
pictures used. Secondly, it analyses the construction and reception of particular narratives 
deployed within the mass media to show how the disaster and its effects were under-
stood. Thirdly, the article focusses on the narrative construction of community in the 
aftermath of the fire. Through letters sent to the Bradford Disaster Appeal Fund, it shows 
how members of the public developed personal narratives and emotional links to the 
tragedy in dialogue with the media’s reporting. Individuals therefore constructed narra-
tives of community and the self to contextualise their affective response to the disaster.15 
This was equally true of adult respondents as it was of children. Through such 
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correspondence, some of which took place in the local press, the article shows how the 
disaster was drawn into a common, cross-cultural experience. Finally, through the pages 
of their own specialist publication, the article examines the longer-term impact of the 
narratives of individual resilience on people injured and bereaved by the fire. In doing so, 
it contends that the role of the media in shaping the emotional environment and 
disseminating ideas of community are important in understanding the social history of 
1980s Britain, when the country witnessed a succession of human-made mass fatality 
disasters which continue to affect people’s lives to this day.
Picturing tragedy
The Bradford City stadium fire unfolded live on national television. In one of the first such 
incidents before the advent of ‘rolling’ twenty-four hour news in the UK, footage of the 
disaster was broadcast to the viewing public as it happened.16 The fire was a multimedia 
event, with its own grammar of seeing and hearing, which also influenced how it was 
reported in the newspapers.17 Horrific images, accompanied by the commentary of an 
audibly shocked John Helm, were televised live, with the cameras capturing sights of 
intense human suffering. The subsequent coverage, on local and national news bulletins, 
followed the broad pattern identified by John Langer in his study of television’s coverage 
of disasters, focusing predominantly on victim stories, interspersed with scenes depicting 
the fire and the burnt-out stand, and interviews with survivors, eye-witnesses and first 
responders.18 Television coverage later turned to the wider community’s response to the 
fire. This included group counselling provided to the survivors and police officers on duty, 
which featured in a documentary broadcast on the first anniversary of the disaster.19 This 
shift in the coverage reflected the changing emotional environment of the disaster, from 
shock and sensationalism to recovery and resilience. Nevertheless, that initial shock, 
which played out live on national television and was repeated by news outlets across 
the world, continued to reverberate.
Where people recorded them in their letters to the disaster appeal, affective responses 
to the footage overwhelmingly emphasised shock, sadness, and grief rather than anger. It 
is important to note here that ‘anger’ is a slippery concept, and as such its meaning within 
the context of 1980s disasters needs to be defined.20 People rationalised their own 
emotional response using the term itself, but anger is also taken to mean expressions 
of frustration and hostility, particularly those directed towards individuals and institutions 
both at the time and some years later.21 Anger was initially muted, however, because of 
the way the disaster unfolded live on television and the imagery which audiences 
witnessed. As images of the fire were broadcast live, the diaster became a moment in 
which men were publicly and openly brought to tears. One couple described how ‘there 
was not a dry eye in our pub including strong men who we thought would never show 
emotion’.22 Another man explained how ‘After seeing the horrific scenes last Saturday on 
ITV news, I was very upset and cried a lot, like many thousands of people throughout 
Great Britain’.23 That these men openly wept should not come as a surprise; the Bradford 
fire came more than ten years after, as Thomas Dixon has argued, ‘British masculinity 
changed’ and men’s tears became a part of football culture.24 Rather, these responses are 
significant as they helped to shape the emotional environment within which the disaster 
was reported.25 Children responded in a similar way, expressing sadness at the images 
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they had witnessed on television. In particular, the imagery of people injured resonated 
with children. One student from South Yorkshire wrote about how ‘None of my friends or 
relations were in the fire but I am very very sad about all those people who got burnt and 
died in the fire’.26 As rational actors and consumers of media coverage, children explained 
their emotional response to the disaster in relation to both the images they saw and the 
reactions of people around them. One noted:
I am very sorry that the Bradford stand has been on fire. I am very upset that it happened. 
I just can not get over it. Everybody just can not get over it because it’s so hard to forget. It 
was awful because a little fire simply spread into a great big fire. I didn’t like the man that was 
on fire and I didn’t like the man that had his hair on fire.27
Another young respondent cited the footage of the disaster as the impetus for his 
fundraising: ‘I was so shocked to see the fire at Bradford football ground on television. 
I felt so sorry for the people that I decided to have a small fair in my garden and I asked my 
friend Timothy to help me’.28 Some young children also expressed their emotional 
response to the fire through drawings, encouraged by their teacher to communicate 
through artwork in what is now a widespread practice of facilitating emotional healing 
following disaster.29 Their drawings frequently replicated the early images broadcast on 
television, featuring the stadium in flame and injured fans, clearly linking their affective 
response to the scenes they witnessed.
If people missed the unsettling scenes as they unfolded live on the television, they 
could not escape them from the Sunday newspapers, which printed graphic scenes of 
extreme injury across their front and inside pages. Many daily newspapers published on 
the Monday followed suit, displaying a startling absence of ethical awareness on the part 
of some editors.30 Both the Sunday Telegraph and The Times printed front-page photo-
graphs that graphically depicted supporters with their clothing alight clambering over 
hoardings onto the pitch, which were taken from live televised scenes.31 The same 
photograph was printed on the front page of the News of the World as well as in the 
Daily Star, albeit tucked away in the middle of the newspaper. It was also printed in the 
Daily Mail, where it is framed within a television set border with the caption ‘Tragedy on 
TV . . . scenes which reduced entire homes of non-football people to tears.’32 Editors 
justified reproducing such images because they had already been screened on television. 
As one feature in the Sunday People, published the morning after the fire, put it: ‘The 
entire nightmare, from first flickering flames to lines of burned bodies being laid out on 
the pitch, were graphically described over the air’. Pictured alongside is a photograph 
depicting a severely injured supporter being dragged from the blazing stand by a police 
officer, illustrating the ‘heroism and heartbreak’ of the tragedy in a single image.33
Not all newspapers printed such graphic photographs, however, which perhaps illus-
trates a level of ethical awareness from some editors towards victims’ families, who were 
likely to be newspaper readers, as well as the wider footballing community. For example, the 
Sun, a football-focused newspaper, opted to print a photograph of the burned-out stand on 
the front page of its 13 May edition. Meanwhile the Daily Mirror, led with its announcement 
of a national fund to help the victims and their families, the Mirror Group Soccer Disaster and 
Safety Fund, to which it contributed £50,000. Whether this was a purely altruistic approach is 
a matter for debate. The newspaper’s owner, Robert Maxwell, was also chairman of Oxford 
United, a football club with an urgent need for refurbishment of its Manor Ground in 
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preparation for its promotion to the First Division. In a speech on the evening of the fire, 
Maxwell identified a similar litany of defects at Manor Ground to those that befell Valley 
Parade. These included wooden stands and cheap plastic seating, a deficiency of hydrants 
and extinguishers, no fire warning system, and stewards ill-trained in fire evacuation 
procedures; up to £1 million would be required to finance ground improvements so that 
the club could compete safely in the First Division. Maxwell consequently wrote to the Prime 
Minister, Margaret Thatcher, calling for a reduction in the football pools betting levy, 
alongside an increased contribution to the Football Grounds Improvement Trust, in order 
to fund ‘the necessary measures required’ and help ‘restore the public confidence in the 
safety of our grounds’ both in Oxford and across the country.34 Not only do Maxwell’s 
remarks point to the paucity of funding in lower-league teams, where supporters preferred 
to see their club spend its limited resources on player acquisitions to bolster their chances of 
promotion, but also the ubiquity of the danger which crumbling infrastructure presented. 
This was especially pertinent in the case of Bradford City, as the club had faced insolvency 
during the 1983–84 season before its finances were restructured under a new board and the 
club embarked on an impressive run of form to secure promotion.35 Beyond the First and 
Second Divisions, on whose clubs the 1975 Safety in Sports Grounds Act applied, under- 
investment in stadium safety meant that the tragedy could, potentially, have happened 
anywhere. As one card sent to the disaster appeal simply put, it ‘could so easily have been 
my family’.36
Nevertheless, there was no shortage of images available to the newspapers for publica-
tion, demonstrating the insensitivity of many national titles in opting to publish upsetting 
photographs. According to the Bradford coroner, James Turnbull, the fire was one of the 
most widely photographed disasters of the 1980s given press photographers were in situ to 
document the awarding of the championship trophy to the players before the match. Whilst 
this inevitably helped with identifying the deceased by tracing their final movements, it also 
served as a traumatic reminder to any families and friends who saw the images.37 
Unsurprisingly, some photographers such as the T&A’s Dennis Flatt, received verbal abuse 
from angry Bradford supporters for documenting the tragedy. Flatt’s editor subsequently 
sold the images to foreign press agencies, raising £17,000 for the disaster fund. Instead of 
reproducing the more graphic photographs available, the T&A focussed predominantly on 
images that depicted the aftermath of the horror, showing material artefacts such as 
a charred souvenir supplement, police officers sorting through discarded and burnt articles 
of clothing, and forensic experts examining the charred remains of the stand.38
Many of the public’s photographs were made available to the police and coroner’s office 
to help with their investigations, and used during the public inquiry in order ‘to try and show 
in graphic form the development of the fire’.39 Some were reproduced in newspapers: the 
T&A, for instance, printed a selection taken by a supporter from the Spion Kop terrace. Other 
supporters sent in their photographs in the hope that they would help readers piece 
together the movements of friends and family at the match.40 The photographs, alongside 
witness testimonies, also challenge the prevailing view amongst certain tabloids that mass 
panic prevailed on the terraces, contributing to the high number of fatalities.41 In addition to 
falsely claiming that the fire had been caused by a smoke-bomb let off by a Bradford 
supporter, the Daily Sport’s football writer Ian Trueman sensationally reported that ‘It was 
every man for himself’ as supporters clambered over fallen bodies in their ‘fight for 
survival’.42 However, his description is at odds with psychologists’ research, which drew 
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upon evidence from this and other mass casualty fires.43 Whilst panic is described more 
frequently in newspaper accounts of fire than in any other disaster situation, it is often used 
as a common trope to generate dramatic effect.44 In reality, as police officers’ testimony to 
the public inquiry revealed, supporters initially followed official advice in evacuating via the 
gates at the back of the stand, and, only when they discovered that these were locked did 
they make the decision to exit onto the pitch, with many pausing to help others to safety on 
route. One of the operational police officers told the public inquiry that ‘there was no panic 
among the crowd who were moving in a reasonably orderly way to the exit.’ Many simply 
followed the advice announced by a club official over the public-address system: ‘Please do 
not panic, make your way to the front, on to the pitch.’45
That few newspapers reported on this testimony suggests that it potentially disrupted 
their preferred narrative by offering a more reliable account of the behaviour of football 
supporters at a time when they were widely derided in print media as hooligans. Indeed, 
1985 was cited as the game’s ‘annus horribilis’ as high-profile incidents of crowd disorder 
bought football’s problems into stark relief for the sport’s governing authorities and 
Thatcher’s Conservative government. Thatcher, who popularised an authoritarian approach 
towards crime and disorder issues, formed an emergency group of senior Cabinet ministers 
tasked with working with chief police officers to devise a raft of measures aimed at 
‘stamping out soccer hooliganism’ in the wake of violence between Luton and Millwall 
supporters during a televised FA Cup match in March. These included installing perimeter 
fencing around pitches, introducing closed-circuit television to identify offenders and 
banning the sale and consumption of alcohol at ‘problem’ grounds. Whilst specialist football 
magazines and club officials criticised the proposals as a slur on the majority of supporters 
and a threat to the finances of clubs in the lower divisions, right-wing daily newspapers and 
the police welcomed the government’s tough stance against ‘soccer’s vandals’.46
It was this shadow of hooliganism that prompted some members of the public to write into 
newspapers bemoaning the pitch-side scenes of ‘mindless jeering’ by young supporters as the 
fire enveloped, cynically interpreting their behaviour as hooliganism: ‘Were these cretins too 
thick to realise people were burning to death, or were they just uncaring? If the latter is the 
case it just shows to what depths some of the youth of today have sunk’.47 Right-wing tabloids 
uncritically reported the theory that ‘yobs’ and ‘louts’ might have been responsible for starting 
the fire, noting that anyone could buy a cheap smoke bomb from garden centres, and 
reporting that the police had interviewed members of the local Ointment crew about their 
potential involvement.48 That some police officers later praised the same ‘soccer thugs’ for 
helping them with the rescue effort was only reported by the T&A, however. As one put it, 
‘Never class all young football followers as hooligans. People from all walks of life and all age 
groups, without any thought of danger to themselves, went into that paddock and stand to 
help the police get people to safety. This was an eye-opener.’49 Not for those whose news diet 
relied solely on tabloids, where it was never reported.
Narrating disaster
The narratives constructed within the press, as well as through television news, shaped how 
many people understood and experienced the disaster. Given the preponderance of 
disasters during the 1980s, understanding how the media narrated them is vital in writing 
the social history of the decade. Stories were packaged together to signify the gravity of the 
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news, with a distinctive visual design in order to set an emotional tone that was sustained 
through personal testimonies gathered from witnesses, survivors, and first responders.50 All 
tabloid and middle-market newspapers used black page borders with inset graphic images 
of the burning stand and short titles to frame their coverage and set it apart from the rest of 
their content. The Daily Mail, for example, initially used a graphic inset titled ‘The Bradford 
Disaster’, which it quickly renamed ‘Disaster at the match’, possibly to distance itself from 
the downmarket Daily Star, which had also used the former title. Nor was this stylistic 
approach limited to the national newspapers: the T&A used different inset images and titles 
for its coverage of both the fire (‘Day of Disaster’) and the public inquiry (‘Day of Disaster 
INQUIRY’), while Fire magazine used a black page border with the title ‘BRADFORD’ and 
depicting a football replacing the letter ‘O’.51 The broadsheet newspapers eschewed such 
stylistic devices, and generally avoided quoting emotionally-charged witnesses, preferring 
instead to focus on the facts as conveyed by emergency service leaders in press releases.52 
Nevertheless, the packaging of newspapers’ coverage helped to ensure that the overarching 
narratives constructed within these publications were clear for the audience.
While the broadsheets focussed on the investigation into the cause of, and the political 
response to, the disaster, tabloids were more interested in the spectacle of the fire and the 
human stories of heroism, near-death experiences, and the trauma of death and injury. They 
used specific narrative tropes, deploying emotionally charged language to describe the 
scenes and its aftermath, in order to arouse readers’ emotions. Before the names of the 
deceased were published on the Wednesday morning, the dead and seriously injured were 
described using a mixture of symbolic representation as well as graphic depictions of bodies 
on fire. The Sunday People, for example, reported how ‘fans see women and kids die’, thereby 
singling out those who its largely white, male working-class readers would have seen as the 
most vulnerable groups in society, while the Daily Mail reported ‘bodies burnt beyond 
recognition’ with ‘dozens scarred for life’.53 Witness testimony was commonly used to 
illustrate some of the more graphic aspects of the fire, the descriptions appearing more 
shocking if they came from eyewitnesses. The Daily Mirror, for instance, quoted a teacher, who 
described how ‘People covered in flames were jumping on top of us. I pulled one woman 
from the front of the stand and she had nothing on her back, neither clothes nor skin’.54 The 
publication of such graphic descriptions thus turned death and injury into spectacle.
Tabloids predominantly focused on white, working-class male supporters, who constituted 
their core readership, portraying the fire as a culturally-specific disaster to befall the city’s 
traditionally white and masculine footballing community, as depicted in photographs of the 
crowd before kick-off.55 Once the names of the deceased were published, other survivors 
emerged onto newspapers’ front pages: one, 12-year-old Martin, ‘the bravest boy in Britain’ as 
he was described, lost his brother, father, uncle and grandfather in the fire and subsequently 
became one of the most well-known faces of the bereaved community, along with his 
mother, Susan.56 Mother and son were subsequently pictured at the family funeral in 
Pudsey, with celebrities at a charity football match at Huddersfield Town, and at the unveiling 
of a sculpture donated by Bradford’s twin city of Hamm on the first anniversary; their 
mourning having been deemed to be newsworthy.57 The most poignant image of the two 
was taken outside Valley Parade as, holding hands, they examined the shrine of flowers, cards 
and scarves left by supporters and other well-wishers. A single photograph embodied both 
the grief of a family and city where the victims were often well-known within their local 
community.58
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Letters to the disaster appeal show how such stories of individual survivors became the 
impetus for charitable donations. Cecily told of the ‘many tragedies’ she had suffered in 
her lifetime, but ‘nothing so tragic as the Bradford Football ground one’. For her, the 
stories of the survivors, whether their service during the Second World War or that of the 
‘young boy who lost most of his family’, likely Martin, particularly resonated.59 Donations 
to the disaster appeal—however large or small—and letters outlining people’s reasons for 
contributing thus became a means through which individuals could articulate narratives 
about their own lives alongside their response to news of the disaster. This was especially 
the case when the respondent had recently lost a loved one and believed that this 
experience helped them to understand or empathise with those bereaved by the disaster. 
S.J.N. wrote that they ‘know from experience that no words can heal the voids left by the 
sudden tragic loss of [a] loved one, because my brother died last year aged only 
fourteen’.60 The affective links between geographically and temporally distant tragedies 
were made clear in a condolence card sent by V.F., who lost her son following a fire at 
a house party in Lewisham, London, in January 1981.61 Without outlining the social and 
historical significance of the fire which killed her son, V.F. explained how ‘My tears and 
sympathy goes with you all. I just can’t explain to you how I felt but I know how you feel 
because I went through the same thing I am so so sorry’.62 Through their correspondence 
and contributions, people were therefore able to articulate their own personal experi-
ences in relation to the narratives put forward within the media. Indeed, expressing past 
bereavement enabled people to convey their understanding of disaster as an experience 
lived by those left behind.
In addition to the survivors, first responders and other experts acted as proxies for the 
dead and the grieving before the names of the deceased could be officially released. 
Firefighters were pictured sifting through the debris of the burnt-out stand, whilst teams 
of forensic scientists were depicted identifying the bodies of the dead, often from the 
personal belongings which had been left behind.63 The police received the greatest level 
of newspaper coverage of the emergency services. With approximately 150 officers on 
duty during the match, police officers featured prominently in stories of evacuation, 
rescue and first aid, while 40 officers were treated for burns. Interviews with senior officers 
revealed the challenge in identifying both the names of the dead and the cause of the 
blaze given the scale of destruction.64
Two police officers stood out as the embodiment of the service’s work during and after 
the fire, and demonstrate the way in which narratives of heroism were gendered, which 
was a long-standing trait of fire rescue reporting.65 First was PC Graham Jones, who 
featured prominently in photographs printed in newspapers with his hair ablaze as he 
assisted supporters from the burning stand.66 The Daily Mirror described how this ‘brave 
policeman, his hair on fire and tunic blazing, rescued two pensioners from the inferno.’ 
Much of the story was given over to Jones’s own recollections of the fire, in which he 
vividly describes how ‘the flames were scorching my lungs. I could feel my arm and hair 
burning. I just had to keep going’.67 Here was a hero, a survivor and a mourner, the 
embodiment of hope and recovery for survivors and the Bradford community. Second 
was PC Janice McLean, one of West Yorkshire Police’s family liaison officers, who was 
interviewed by journalists about the trauma of notifying next of kin, and which was 
published across national and local daily newspapers, and in specialist magazines, com-
monly accompanied by a photograph of her wiping a tear away from the eye. Her 
CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 9
selection for interview, as the sole female officer in the police liaison team, presented 
a warmer and more emotional image of the police alongside the more conventional 
stories of life-saving and first-aid involving her male colleagues at the ground. She 
commented on the difficulty of her role, describing how ‘It is impossible to remain 
detached—each time it is like losing one of your own’. In particular, she recounted one 
traumatic case where she ‘felt the tears coming and had to turn away to the window . . . 
I stood there pretending to look out until the tears stopped and I had got myself under 
control again.’68 Both officers fit into contemporary stereotypes regarding gender roles 
within the police: male officers put themselves in danger on the frontline in order to 
spontaneously protect life, while female officers provided counselling that was removed 
from the immediate danger of the fire. Indeed, McLean is described in terms related to her 
gender and age (the Sun patronisingly refers to her as a ‘pretty policewoman’ and 
‘bachelor girl’), rather than her skills.69
The construction of heroes within media narratives of the disaster provided audiences 
with active figures of resilience who were able to remain calm in the face of a mass 
casualty disaster. While stories of supporters’ heroism offered a buoyant counterpoint in 
the coverage of the tragedy, the steadfast actions of emergency services personnel 
became a prominent feature in the public response to disasters. For example, Kevin 
S. wrote: ‘The positive “working together” of police and members of the public to aid 
the injured is something we should never forget. The bravery was something to behold’.70 
While Kevin S. saw first responders’ role as something of a spectacle, ten-year-old Richard 
from Cardiff made a clear link between the actions of the emergency services and the 
potential scale of the disaster. He asserted that ‘If it wasn’t for the brave police and nurses 
it could well be more than two hundred killed the[y] were real heroes to run in to the fire 
and save lives’.71 In describing these heroic acts carried out by police officers and others 
present during the fire and its immediate aftermath, these correspondents show how the 
footage of the disaster, and the subsequent mediation of police actions, shaped con-
temporary understandings of how the events unfolded. Moreover, the qualities of resolu-
tion and bravery in the face of catastrophe were ascribed to a broader group of people 
who responded to and were affected by the disaster. As David M., a deputy head teacher, 
wrote in a note to accompany the money raised by the children at his school: ‘The 
fortitude of families, the heroism of the rescue services, the devotion of our doctors and 
nurses, and the generosity of the people have inspired the best in all of us’.72 Clearly, 
correspondents used examples of heroism and inspiration to focus on the positive aspects 
of the disaster’s aftermath. This was especially important to people like Lara L., who felt 
‘unable to express my true feelings in this incident’ but nonetheless sought to acknowl-
edge the ‘true heroism people showed’.73 Thus, while for some people letters to the 
disaster appeal afforded an opportunity to express their feelings and advance narratives 
of selfhood, others felt unable to do so. If, as Brooke argued, ‘Emotion provided 
a framework of knowledge and a language for understanding’, then the inability to 
articulate those emotions at that moment likely indicated the ongoing processing of 
one’s personal response.74 Under those circumstances, the media’s narratives provided 
a formula for understanding upon which individuals could draw.
Human tragedy and heroism were equally compelling media material, providing the 
opportunity to write ‘colour pieces’ to appeal to readers’ emotional investment into the 
story. Working under editorial pressure to win the ‘circulation war’ between rival tabloids, 
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journalists went to great lengths to interview survivors, utilising intrusive and aggressive 
tactics to gain entry to hospitals. At the Bradford Royal Infirmary, for instance, nurses 
complained of the flashbulbs of cameras distracting them from caring for patients. One 
patient, David, recalled how, as the nurses ‘pulled the curtains round, there were cameras 
coming up to the windows, flashing.’ Some members of the press had brought steplad-
ders to the hospital to gain access to the first-floor ward on which the majority of the 
patients were being treated. David could only lie face down on the bed as his nurse, who 
was ‘doing her nut’, had the photographers removed.75 Similar concerns were raised by 
the arrival of journalists at the Pinderfields Burns Unit. Its director, Dr John Settle, recalled 
how journalists camped ‘around the outside . . . wanting to get in’, repeatedly telephoning 
the unit ‘demanding information’ from his staff. Eventually, Settle agreed to let a small 
news camera crew into the central unit, accompanied by a nurse who limited their access 
to the patients with life-threatening injuries.76
Journalists defended their behaviour as being in the public interest, claiming that 
readers wanted first-hand accounts from survivors. When the patients were transferred to 
nearby St Luke’s Hospital, journalists rushed onto the ward and ‘grabbed somebody to 
talk to’ before they were removed by security. Recognising that they were unlikely to 
leave without a story, David agreed to be interviewed ‘for the sake of a more general 
peace and quiet’.77 His interview, with accompanying photograph of him sitting up in his 
bed with his arms bandaged and hoisted up in what later became known as the ‘Bradford 
Sling’, appeared in multiple newspapers. David subsequently became the civilian face of 
the fire, an unlikely hero who put others’ safety before his own. His story was both 
dramatic and heroic, and suited journalists’ appetite to generate a compassionate story 
from the horror, shifting the focus from community despair to pride. He first helped 
evacuate his section of the stand; then, in his escape, assisted a 69-year-old woman over 
a six-foot high barrier, before dragging a disabled man to safety, during which he received 
burns to his back and head from a flash over. He then beat out the man’s burning jacket 
with his bare hands, suffering serious burns which required skin grafts and weeks of 
physiotherapy. Later awarded the Queen’s Gallantry Medal for Bravery, David’s story was 
critical to newspaper accounts of disasters because it made such events more realistic and 
knowable to readers from similar social backgrounds.78 His story also reassured readers 
that cherished values such as courage and compassion were in evidence at a time that 
some newspapers and politicians conflated the fire with hooliganism.79
Defining community, signifying belonging
Notwithstanding some of the difficulties posed by journalistic intrusion and demands for 
up-to-date briefing information, the media can also play a positive role in mediating post- 
disaster relief efforts with compassion. It does so by regularly sharing safety advice from 
the emergency services as well as relaying contact information to the general public 
anxious to help the authorities and the bereaved.80 The local media in Bradford was 
intimately involved with the launch of the Disaster Appeal Fund following the fire. With its 
operation based at City Hall, the Fund received the backing of the T&A and Pennine Radio: 
the latter held on-air auctions to raise money, while the former extensively covered fund- 
raising events, publicised the appeal and Helpline telephone numbers, and monitored the 
total sums raised. Fund-raising events included a charity football match between the 1966 
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football World Cup finalists England and West Germany at Leeds United’s Elland Road 
ground, a benefit concert at Bradford’s St George’s Hall headlined by local rock band 
Smokie, and the release of a charity single with the intention to raise a lot of money ‘on 
similar lines as the Band Aid single did for Ethiopia’.81 As Lucy Robinson has argued, the 
charity single connected the tradition of philanthropy with a yearning for a sense of 
community and collective identity ‘in the face of Thatcherite Authoritarian Populism’.82 
The response to Bradford was little different. A group of celebrities from the world of 
music and light entertainment known collectively as The Crowd recorded a version of 
Gerry Marsden’s 1963 hit single, and widely recognised football anthem, ‘You’ll Never 
Walk Alone’, which spent two weeks at number 1 in the UK Singles Chart and raised 
£100,000 to help launch a burns research unit at the University of Bradford.83 Nor was the 
T&A only interested in reporting significant sums of money; in fact, it arguably gave more 
coverage to the small sums of money raised—from school-children’s pocket money 
donations to a pensioner’s bingo prize winnings. These smaller sums, it suggested, 
were indicative of the strong level of community spirit evident in the city.84
This stress on community spirit, presumably designed to calm its grieving readers, 
distinguished local newspapers from their national counterparts. Journalists from national 
outlets did not remain in the city for longer than a few days—even reporters for specialist 
football magazines quickly moved on to cover the FA Cup Final, aware of their core 
readers’ interests in the big match—but returned to cover official visits by the Prime 
Minister and the Prince and Princess of Wales, and to report on the public inquiry.85 Such 
visits, whilst newsworthy events, were carefully managed affairs, which inevitably 
shielded most journalists, and the public figures themselves, from any potential confron-
tations. The itinerary for Thatcher’s visit to Bradford, for instance, included meetings with 
civic dignitaries at City Hall, the chairman and club officials at Valley Parade, representa-
tives from the emergency services, as well as visits to St Luke’s and Bradford Royal 
Infirmary, where she met privately with handpicked patients. National newspaper cover-
age overwhelmingly concentrated on her visit to the stadium, where she praised the spirit 
of Bradford and was photographed, flanked by her husband Denis, laying a wreath of 
hand-picked flowers from Chequers outside the burned stand.86
The T&A interpreted its role as speaking on behalf of the city, regularly reporting on the 
efforts of the Bradford Metropolitan District Council, the football club and other civic institu-
tions in coming together to help rebuild grieving communities. Its first editorial following the 
fire reproduced the text of the sermon given by the Bishop of Bradford at a memorial service 
held in the city’s cathedral the previous morning. The Bishop spoke of a celebratory occasion 
that had been ‘cruelly turned to tragedy.’ Yet even at its lowest ebb, there was hope for ‘this 
noble city of Bradford’, which had ‘endured varying degrees of tragedy both economic and 
commercial’ in recent years, not least the collapse of its textile industry, rising unemployment, 
the shadow of the 1981 urban disorders, and the torment of the Yorkshire Ripper murders. 
Moreover, this was an opportunity for the city to unite around its grief, whereby the football 
club, ‘with the help of the community’, could ‘triumph over tragedy’, and for ‘all Bradfordians’ 
to ‘surround all those who suffer with love, sympathy and practical support.’87 By referring to 
‘all Bradfordians’, the Bishop was referencing the city’s multiple faith and ethnic communities 
at a time when the city was subject to negative external perceptions about its growing Asian 
population. Bradford had one of the largest ethnic minority populations of British cities by the 
early 1980s, with just under 50,000 resident South Asians by 1981, of which around fifty 
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per cent were Muslim. A large proportion of this population was concentrated in the inner 
city, especially in the Manningham area surrounding Valley Parade.88 Though significant in 
number, Bradford’s British Asian communities were relatively newly established.89 The initial, 
albeit limited, focus on the role of the Pakistani community in responding to the disaster 
should therefore be seen within the context of the race relations paradigm, through which 
local civic leaders, including a growing number of British Asians and in this instance supported 
by the local press, sought to manage and improve the connection between the predomi-
nantly white football fans and the largely Pakistani community on the stadium’s doorstep.
This emphasis on the city’s multiple faith communities coming together intensified 
following the appointment of Councillor Mohammed Ajeeb as Bradford’s Lord Mayor 
a week after the fire. The significance of Ajeeb’s appointment—the first British Asian man 
to hold such an office—cannot be understated. Born in Kashmir, Ajeeb arrived in Britain in 
1957 at the age of 18, initially labouring in a Nottingham soap factory, before working in 
public transport. He moved to Bradford in the early 1970s, becoming director of Shelter’s 
Housing and Renewal programme and chairman of the local Community Relations 
Council.90 Ajeeb went on to become chairman of the Council’s Labour Group in 1984, 
from where he was elevated to the mayoralty the following year. ‘Mohammed the healer’, 
as one newspaper described him, subsequently became the public figurehead of the 
appeal fund, regularly pictured in the T&A alongside his wife, receiving donations raised 
by community groups and occasionally featured in national newspapers. Ajeeb publicly 
spoke of his hope that the tragedy would unite the city, touring its many communities 
and meeting with community leaders as well as national and foreign leaders. In his 
inaugural speech in City Hall, he proclaimed that ‘Class, creed and race does not divide 
us. There are only the helpers and the helped’ and went on to predict that ‘we will remain 
united and the typical Bradford spirit with all citizens pulling in the same direction will 
come through.’91 As former chairman of the Community Relations Council, Ajeeb was 
acutely aware of the limited extent of everyday multiculturalism in the city, and thus used 
his position to rhetorically construct a multi-ethnic civic identity based on communities’ 
responses to the disaster.
Ajeeb was not alone in calling for collective unity as an emotional response to the fire. 
Through letters to the editor, a self-selecting group of community activists used the 
tragedy to perform a sense of belonging to the city of Bradford and British society more 
generally.92 This belonging was not ‘won’ through individual or collective acts of heroism, 
but through participating in public and collective mourning in the pages of local news-
papers. In the days following the fire, the T&A printed numerous letters sent to the editors 
by a range of authors, some of them also enclosing money for the disaster fund. The 
language used invoked a sense of collective belonging within Bradford’s emerging multi- 
cultural civic community. C. M. Khan, President of the Council of Mosques, offered his 
‘profoundest sympathy and condolences’ on behalf of his members and the Muslim 
community in Bradford. He went on to say that the Muslim community ‘share[s] their 
grief and misfortune in their loss’.93 Councillor Mohammad Riaz, Secretary of the Bradford 
Pakistan Community Centre Association, invoked similar language.94 Nor were these 
assertions of grief and belonging limited to British Asian community organisations. On 
behalf of the Bradford Branch of the Federation of Ukrainians in Great Britain, V. Smereka 
wrote: ‘We are all mourning the dead, and feel deeply with the families who have lost 
loved ones . . . We Ukrainians who came through the war deeply understand the suffering 
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and pain of loss and injury’.95 Faith and cultural organisations also responded to the 
disaster by contributing money. For example, the Sikh Youth Federation raised £50 during 
a special day of prayer to commemorate the 1984 storming of the Golden Temple in 
Amritsar, India. Bradford West MP Max Madden asked that the T&A be informed of this 
donation to highlight the cross-faith, cross-community response to the disaster, perhaps 
aware of the positive impact this might have on local community relations.96 Community 
associations played a variety of roles in post-war British urban society, but in the aftermath 
of the Bradford fire, we can see how they used their self-appointed role as representatives 
of a particular ‘community’ to speak on its behalf. In doing so, they performed a type of 
collective citizenship through which the disaster could be re-cast as a tragedy affecting 
a multi-cultural city, rather than being isolated to the stadium and its community of 
football fans.
Others rationalised their response to the disaster by invoking ideas of community based 
around football, the city of Bradford, and personal links to the tragedy, including friends and 
relatives having been present during the fire. The communal pull of football was especially 
strong in letters to the disaster appeal; as one correspondent, the secretary of a small club in 
Liverpool, reasoned: ‘Football and sport generally forge close links between communities’.97 
As such, contributors to the fund frequently invoked their support of Bradford City and other 
clubs. Margaret S., whose father had played for and subsequently worked as a trainer at 
Bradford, felt unable to ‘put down on paper all that the City fire means to me’. This was 
because ‘We have been involved with them so long haven’t we?’98 Other respondents were 
less emotive, simply signing their letter as a fan of whichever club they supported. Just as 
football provided a means to articulate a personal connection to the disaster, numerous 
respondents articulated a connection to the disaster through having lived in Bradford. As 
one correspondent put it: ‘I originally come from Bradford, and even though we have lived 
in numerous places, Bradford is still “Home”’.99 While the media, especially the local press, 
played an important role in the construction of civic and other communities, people 
responded to this by invoking their own narratives of belonging, and football provided 
one of these communities that united the nation in its collective grief.100
Local newspapers repeatedly returned to the idea of a Bradford spirit in their evocation 
of the city’s recovery in the weeks following the fire. Civic officials, football club officials 
and medical professionals were all quoted speaking about the importance of loyalty and 
togetherness in helping the bereaved families and communities recover.101 The club was 
central to the city’s recovery, which helps explain why anger was rarely directed towards 
club officials, particularly in letters from supporters printed in the T&A.102 Mervi Pantti and 
Karin Wahl-Jorgensen have argued that expressions of anger following the Bradford fire 
were less frequent compared to other human-made disasters, especially within the local 
press. This did not reflect an absence of anger in any sense of the term, but a focus on 
publicising the Disaster Appeal as well as a desire amongst supporters to urge the 
government to urgently fund the ground’s redevelopment with a memorial stand to 
remember the victims.103 One leading psychiatrist who had studied the aftermath of the 
Aberfan mining tragedy in 1966 noted that the fire had already been ‘built into the history 
of Bradford’, much as the coal slip had scarred the mental landscape of the Welsh village, 
and would need to be harnessed to positive effect in order to help the city ‘grow through 
its mourning’.104 While some expected this growth might come quickly, for many, 
mourning was a long process.
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Personal resilience and communal bereavement
In 1989 one Mass Observer lamented that, in the aftermath of disasters, ‘It is left to the 
Social Services to cope [. . .] The world has lost its sensitivity’.105 While their concerns 
reflected the rise of individualism within British society in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
increasing role of social services in responding to the long-term effects of disaster was 
particularly remarkable in the aftermath of the Bradford City stadium fire.106 Social work-
ers’ activities in the aftermath of the fire were notably varied and have been called 
a ‘watershed in welfare responses to disaster in Britain’. This breakpoint, Tim Newburn 
argued, was in response to the ‘terrifying images of death and destruction’ which were 
heightened from the mid-1980s by the ‘proximity of the mass media to the events as they 
unfolded’.107 Bradford social workers’ response to the fire was therefore shaped by 
people’s experiences of the media reporting but, as this section demonstrates, also 
facilitated the mediation of individual and collective emotions. Following the fire, 
Bradford social services established three principal forums for the discussion of bereave-
ment and trauma: the City Link newsletter, a special programme of counselling at the Link 
Centre, and the Helpline.108 These three forums provided dedicated spaces for the 
discussion of injury and bereavement within a community of people affected in 
a myriad of ways by the fire. What is more, they brought together different elements of 
welfare provision and became a model for social workers responding to later mass 
casualty disasters through the transmission of expertise to other local authorities.109 
Nevertheless, the duration and depth of engagement which people affected by the 
disaster had with a specialist newsletter established by Bradford social workers set the 
stadium fire apart as a tragedy experienced through diverse media.
In October 1985, the first City Link newsletter arrived through the letterboxes of over 300 
families injured or bereaved by the fire. Set up by three medical social workers at St Luke’s 
Hospital in Bradford, City Link was a specialist publication which enabled people to narrate 
their own experiences, rather than having their stories limited by the established formats of 
letters to the editor, sensationalised reporting, or ‘vox pops’ mediated by journalists. The 
reach of City Link was limited to those defined by the St Luke’s social workers as having been 
directly affected by the tragedy—usually those who were themselves injured or lost a close 
relative. Even then, it was only sent to those whose addresses the social workers had on file. 
‘It is not a newspaper to satisfy the curiosity of onlookers or even inform’, they reasoned. ‘It is 
only for those involved’.110 Limiting the readership in this way established the parameters 
for the public discussion of bereavement and injury, in which potential contributors were 
reassured that sharing their experiences could aid in their own recovery, as well as providing 
reassurance to others, reasoning that ‘It could be that just knowing others have the same 
problems will be welcome news’.111
Newsletter contributors largely responded to the editors’ intentions, perhaps incenti-
vised by the boundaries of readership set by the social workers. One mother, who lost her 
daughter in the fire, wrote about how friends, family, neighbours and colleagues rallied 
around to support her and her husband in the months following the disaster. Reflecting on 
their luck, she allowed her telephone number to be published in the newsletter for anyone 
who might be lacking such support.112 Another wrote of her guilt after realising that the 
death of her parents had ‘solved the [financial] problems’ of caring for them in their old 
age.113 These public discussions of the feelings which resulted from the bereavement 
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process—luck and guilt on top of sadness and numbness—provide an important insight 
into what is more typically a private experience. They also challenge the narratives of 
heroism and resilience published in national and local newspapers. While some wrote of 
the strength they had found, the City Link forum enabled people to express their stories of 
not coping and still feeling angry months and years after the disaster. One contributor 
wrote, two years after the fire, about how they ‘don’t feel to be getting over the shock and 
grief’ of losing their father.114 While explicit statements of anger were largely absent from 
City Link, there were frequent references to others having experienced it and acknowl-
edgements that anger, along with other feelings, were ‘a normal reaction to the death of 
a loved one’.115 The ability to discuss ways in which people were not coping with the 
tragedy extended to the issue of mental health, with individuals freely acknowledging 
‘feeling depressed, nerves on edge’, or taking anti-depressants.116 To an extent, limiting 
the audience of the newsletter facilitated a communal experience which enabled people to 
more freely discuss topics and feelings which, in other forums, may have been considered 
taboo. This was especially important given the preponderance of mental health issues 
among people who have experienced burns injuries.117
While some people appear to have taken solace in expressing their grief on the pages of 
City Link, others were content with reading the stories of other people’s experiences of 
burns injury, which engendered a sense of community within their private bereavement 
and recovery. This was especially important for people who lived alone.118 The newsletter 
thus enabled people injured in the stadium fire, and their families, to learn from others’ 
experiences of burns injuries. Peter Proctor, a professional racing driver who experienced 
65% burns following a crash in 1966 wrote of his twenty-year recovery.119 Simon Weston, 
a British Army soldier who experienced 46% burns following the bombing of the RFA Sir 
Galahad during the Falklands War, along with his mother Pauline Hatfield, wrote of their 
experiences in the third issue of the newsletter. Hatfield, in particular, wrote of being 
Weston’s ‘whipping boy’ for several months after his injury, as he came to terms with 
their effects on his body, appearance, and sense of self-worth.120 These accounts of well- 
known people’s experiences of burns injuries and care augmented the reflections of 
Bradford’s survivors and bereaved, providing longer-term perspectives which emphasised 
improvement over time. They were, in effect, messages of hope. Several people who were 
unable to write about their own personal experiences of the disaster expressed the benefits 
which reading others’ accounts had had on their wellbeing. As one reader was quoted as 
saying: ‘I get lots of comfort from it, reading other people’s letters, though I can’t put my 
feelings down on paper yet’.121 The affective benefits of the newsletter therefore came, not 
just from cathartic expressions of grief and recovery from injury, but the assurance that 
there were common experiences; that people were not suffering alone.
Save for the annual memorial events publicised in the local press and the occasional 
mention in relation to other news stories, including articles on the continuing work of the Link 
Centre, the Bradford City stadium fire had, by the late 1980s, largely disappeared from the 
pages of the national newspapers. While City Link provided a dedicated space for the public 
discussion of bereavement and recovery, its content drew on the experiences of a small pool 
of contributors. In 1988, three years after the fire, the newsletter ceased publication, with 
a final issue celebrating the work which had been done, including winning an award from the 
magazine Social Work Today for the newsletter’s ‘major contribution to the public image of 
professional social work’.122 But the pain caused by the fire continued, with some people 
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receiving counselling at the Link Centre for five years after the fire, when the dedicated 
disaster bereavement programme was to be wound down.123 Barbara Hudson, of the National 
and Local Government Officers’ Association, contended that the coverage of the Valley Parade 
fire in the national and local media facilitated people’s recovery by allowing for the open 
discussion of the effects of injury and bereavement, and removing part of the stigma of 
needing to use social services.124 Media reporting of disasters, however, was of limited 
advantage to the psychological and emotional health of survivors. The successive tragedies 
which beset Britain’s decade of disaster brought the memories of the Bradford City fire to the 
fore, and some people walked through the doors of the Link Centre for the first time several 
years after the event.125 The Hillsborough tragedy was particularly resonant. On 15 April 1989, 
96 Liverpool football fans were killed and hundreds more injured in what is now the worst 
sporting disaster in modern British history. Like Bradford, the disaster unfolded live on 
television; clips were repeatedly broadcast on the news; and newspapers carried horrific 
images of the injured, dead, and dying.126 Two weeks later at Valley Parade, Bradford and 
Lincoln City played their first match since 1985, raising funds for the Hillsborough Disaster 
Appeal; the matchday programme stressed the ‘special bond of friendship’ between the two 
clubs.127 The emotional impact of the Bradford fire, then, was not limited to its immediate 
aftermath, and the psychological effects not only shaped by the reporting of the singular 
tragedy. As still more disasters occurred during the 1980s, and after, the experiences of 
survivors and the bereaved continued to be affected by the media.
Conclusion
The legacy of the Bradford City fire was secured with the installation of three permanent 
memorials to commemorate the tragedy and conjoin the club and the city. The first, in 
Centenary Square outside Bradford City Hall, is a sculpture by Joachim Reisner depicting 
three figures symbolising life, upon which are engraved the names of the 56 victims. 
Donated by the City of Hamm, Bradford’s twin city in Germany, it was unveiled by 
Councillor Ajeeb, the Oberburgermaster of Hamm and the Labour party leader, Neil 
Kinnock, on the first anniversary of the fire.128 The second, a sculpture by Patricia 
McAllister of a kneeling woman surrounded by young footballers, was donated to the 
football club for its reopening and placed above the entrance to the executive suites; it 
was later moved to the main stand near to where the fire originated.129 A third memorial, 
a black marble fascia with the names of the 56 victims inscribed in gold, was donated by the 
club itself and sited near the main entrance to the ground following its refurbishment upon 
the seventeenth anniversary of the disaster. In addition to these fixed memorials, an annual 
service is held outside City Hall, a minute’s silence before the club’s final home game of the 
season, and ongoing fundraising for the Bradford Burns Research Unit, which ensure that 
the disaster is remembered in a dignified manner.130 This memorialisation continues to 
unite a community affected by disaster. That community was defined, albeit in different 
ways, within the mass media and specialist publications like City Link. Though before the 
disaster the city’s British Asian population was growing in size as well as cultural, civic, and 
commercial importance, the fire helped to forge a multicultural civic identity in Bradford 
against a backdrop of significant social unrest. While racialised disparities remain, this 
multicultural civic identity continues to be performed and reinforced through local news-
paper and television coverage of the major anniversaries.131
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The Bradford City stadium fire was the first in a series of disasters which unfolded live— 
or near live—on television and became a mass media event. As the 1980s wore on, the 
accelerating frequency of mass casualty disasters came to define the decade, and their 
media reporting shaped the way these tragedies were understood and experienced. 
People’s knowledge and understanding of the fire was influenced by their personal 
experiences and connections, however close, with the city, football club and the suppor-
ters who were injured or killed during the disaster, but was also clearly shaped by media 
coverage from newspapers, radio and television. Media coverage certainly varied in terms 
of its quality and sympathy, with some publishing graphic images false stories. As the 
emotional environment shifted, the stories published by national newspapers became 
less sensationalist, but the legacies of this reporting lived on in some people’s under-
standing of the disaster, and in the everyday experiences of the survivors and bereaved. 
This was especially clear on the pages of City Link, through which people affected by the 
disaster described how their grief was continuing long after others expected them to have 
moved on and was even heightened by the reporting of subsequent tragedies.
The Bradford City fire raises significant—and largely unresolved—questions about the 
efficacy of the state’s retreat from enacting life-saving regulations and investment. It 
occurred on the cusp of the Conservative government opening consultations on its pro-
posed reform of fire precautions, seeking to reduce the level of government regulation of 
public safety to a minimum by introducing a greater degree of choice and flexibility for 
individual firms and industry bodies to regulate their own affairs.132 The legacy of the 
subsequent public inquiry chaired by Sir Oliver Popplewell was more pronounced in his 
recommendations to improve crowd control by addressing the game’s widely reported 
hooliganism crisis. Many of Popplewell’s key recommendations, including all-seater stands, 
greater use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) to identify troublemakers, and installation of 
new turnstiles and stairways, were adopted in the £2.6 million rebuilding of Valley Parade, 
and Popplewell himself was invited to open the stadium in December 1986.133
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